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Abstract
We study a simplified version of full street, three player Kuhn poker, in which
the weakest card, J, must be checked and/or folded by a player who holds it. The
number of nontrivial betting frequencies that must be calculated is thereby reduced
from 23 to 11, and all equilibrium solutions can be found analytically. In particular,
there are three ranges of values of the pot size, P , for which there are three distinct,
coexisting equilibrium solutions. We also study an ordinary differential equation
model of repeated play of the game, which we expect to be at least qualitatively
accurate when all players both adjust their betting frequencies sufficiently slowly and
have sufficiently short memories. We find that none of the equilibrium solutions of
the game is asymptotically stable as a solution of the ordinary differential equations.
Depending on the pot size, the solution may be periodic, close to periodic or have
long chaotic transients. In each case, the rates at which the players accumulate
profit closely match those associated with one of the equilibrium solutions of the
game.
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1 Introduction
In [1], we studied a simplified version of one-third street, three player Kuhn poker that
has three distinct equilibrium solutions. We also studied the dynamics of two models
of repeated play of this game. One undesirable feature of the game studied in [1] is
that the restrictions on play are somewhat artificial. Another is that the play is over
just one-third of a street. In this paper, we study a different simplification of three
player Kuhn poker that retains more of the complexity of the full game, but is simple
enough that its equilibrium solutions can be found analytically when it is played as a
full street game. The simplification is that, of the four cards in the deck, only A, K
and Q are active; a J must be checked and/or folded by a player who holds it1. This
means that the dynamics of the game involve sandbagging with A, bluffing with Q and
bluff-catching with K2. This is complex enough to lead to an interesting and nontrivial
equilibrium solution structure. In the full game, bluffing can be with either J or Q and
bluff-catching with either Q or K, and overcalling with K may be profitable, which makes
the task of finding the equilibrium solutions significantly more challenging.
We begin in Section 2 where we outline the rules of the game and describe the
eleven nontrivial betting frequencies controlled by the players. In Section 3 we derive the
equilibrium solutions for all P ≥ 2. Finally, in Section 4, we study an ordinary differential
equation model of repeated play of the game, and find that the dynamic behaviour is
strongly dependent on the pot size, P , and never leads to a steady, equilibrium solution.
2 Simplified three player Kuhn poker
The deck contains four cards, A > K > Q > J, and each of the three players is dealt
a single card at random. There is a pot of P ≥ 2 units. If P < 2 there is no incentive
1This could be enforced in practice by imposing a large penalty on any player who is revealed to have
bet with J when her card is shown down.
2These terms will be explained below.
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for any player to bet or call with worse than A, so we exclude this case from the outset.
The first decision is made by Player 1, who must choose whether to check or bet one
unit. If Player 1 bets, Players 2 and 3 must decide in turn whether to call or fold. If
Player 1 checks, the decision passes to Player 2, and play proceeds in the same way. If
the action is check/check/check or a bet is called, there is a showdown of the unfolded
cards at which the player with the highest ranked card wins the pot and all the bets. If
two players fold, the remaining player wins the pot. The full decision tree is shown in
Figure 1.
The crucial difference between this game and standard Kuhn poker is that J is a
dead card. A player who is dealt J must check and/or fold at each of their decision
points. In this way, the game is reduced to a form more similar to two player Kuhn
poker. The three players must decide whether to: (i) bet with A, hoping to be called
by K, or check and hope a player with Q bluffs so that they can call and win an extra
bet (known as sandbagging); (ii) bet with Q and hope both that A has not been dealt
and that the player who holds K folds (bluffing); (iii) call a bet with K hoping that the
bet was a bluff with Q (bluff-catching). The card J is in the deck simply to make the
game nontrivial, since a three card deck always deals a winning A to one of the players.
There are just eleven nontrivial betting frequencies that must be chosen by the players.
As we shall see, we are able to determine all of the equilibrium solutions analytically.
In contrast, there are 23 nontrivial betting frequencies in standard three player Kuhn
poker, in which bluffing can be with J or Q, bluffcatching with Q or K and a player may
wish to overcall with K, which makes the equilibria of the game much harder to find
analytically. The only published equilibrium solution is for P = 3, described in [5].
Note that in our simplified game: (i) betting with K is dominated by checking for
every player, because two thirds of the time one of the remaining players will hold A
and call; (ii) after a bet and a call, the remaining player will call only with A. Our
notation for the non-trivial betting frequencies of Player i is bi for betting with Q (her
bluffing frequency), ci for calling with K after a bet, di for calling with K after a bet
and a fold, and ai for betting with A
3. After Players 1 and 2 check, betting with A
dominates checking for Player 3, so a3 = 1. There are therefore eleven frequencies to be
determined.
31− ai is her sandbagging frequency.
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1 (b1, 0, a1)
2 (0, c2, 1)
3 (0, 0, 1)
Call Fold
Call
3 (0, d3, 1)
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2 (b2, 0, a2)
3 (0, c3, 1)
1 (0, 0, 1)
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1 (0, d1, 1)
Call Fold
Fold
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3 (b3, 0, 1)
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Figure 1: The decision tree for three player, full street simplified Kuhn poker. Open circles are decision nodes (labelled by
the player making the decision), whilst solid circles are terminal nodes. Betting and calling frequencies with (Q, K, A) are
shown at each node. A player who holds J must check and/or fold.
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3 Equilibrium solutions
By considering each of the 24 distinct deals of three of the four cards and the probabilities
of each outcome, we find that the expected profits of the three players, Ei for i = 1, 2
and 3, are given by
24E1 = {−2b2 + 2c2 − 2b3 + 2d3 − b2c3} a1 + {2P − 4− (P + 1) (c2 + d3)} b1
+ {b2 − 2 + (P + a2) b3)}c1 + {(P + 1) b2 − 2a2} d1 + (2− P ) b3 + (2 + c3 − P ) b2, (1)
24E2 = {2d1 + 2c3 − 2b3 − c1b3 − b1c3} a2 + {2P − 4 + 2a1 − (P + 1) (c3 + d1)} b2
+ {Pb1 − 2a1} c2 + {(P + 1) b3 − 2 + b1} d2 + (2− P + c1) b3 + (2− P ) b1, (2)
24E3 = {2P − 4 + 2a1 + 2a2 − (P + 1) (c1 + d2)} b3 + {(P + a1) b2 − (2− b1) a2} c3+
{(P + 1) b1 − 2a1} d3 + (2− P − c1) b2 + 2c1 + (2− P + c2 − d2) b1 + 2d2. (3)
Since Player i chooses ai, bi, ci and di to maximise Ei, the eleven conditions that must
be satisfied by an equilibrium solution are:
1. (a) b1 > 2a1/P & c2 = 1,
(b) b1 < 2a1/P & c2 = 0,
(c) b1 = 2a1/P .
2. (a) b1 > 2a1/(P + 1) & d3 = 1,
(b) b1 < 2a1/(P + 1) & d3 = 0,
(c) b1 = 2a1/(P + 1).
3. (a) c2 + d3 < (2P − 4)/(P + 1) & b1 = 1,
(b) c2 + d3 > (2P − 4)/(P + 1) & b1 = 0,
(c) c2 + d3 = (2P − 4)/(P + 1).
4. (a) c2 + d3 > b3 + (1 +
1
2c3)b2 & a1 = 1,
(b) c2 + d3 < b3 + (1 +
1
2c3)b2 & a1 = 0,
(c) c2 + d3 = b3 + (1 +
1
2c3)b2 .
5. (a) b2 > (2− b1)a2/(P + a1) & c3 = 1,
(b) b2 < (2− b1)a2/(P + a1) & c3 = 0,
(c) b2 = (2− b1)a2/(P + a1).
6. (a) b2 > 2a2/(P + 1) & d1 = 1,
(b) b2 < 2a2/(P + 1) & d1 = 0,
(c) b2 = 2a2/(P + 1).
5
7. (a) c3 + d1 < (2P − 4 + 2a1)/(P + 1) & b2 = 1,
(b) c3 + d1 > (2P − 4 + 2a1)/(P + 1) & b2 = 0,
(c) c3 + d1 = (2P − 4 + 2a1)/(P + 1).
8. (a) c3 + d1 >
1
2c3b1 + (1 +
1
2c1)b3 & a2 = 1,
(b) c3 + d1 <
1
2c3b1 + (1 +
1
2c1)b3 & a2 = 0,
(c) c3 + d1 =
1
2c3b1 + (1 +
1
2c1)b3 .
9. (a) b3 > (2− b2)/(P + a2) & c1 = 1,
(b) b3 < (2− b2)/(P + a2) & c1 = 0,
(c) b3 = (2− b2)/(P + a2).
10. (a) b3 > (2− b1)/(P + 1) & d2 = 1,
(b) b3 < (2− b1)/(P + 1) & d2 = 0,
(c) b3 = (2− b1)/(P + 1).
11. (a) c1 + d2 < (2P − 4 + 2a1 + 2a2)/(P + 1) & b3 = 1,
(b) c1 + d2 > (2P − 4 + 2a1 + 2a2)/(P + 1) & b3 = 0,
(c) c1 + d2 = (2P − 4 + 2a1 + 2a2)/(P + 1).
At least one of the subconditions labelled (a), (b) and (c) must be satisfied for each of
the eleven conditions. There are however several possibilities that we can eliminate.
• 3.(a) cannot hold. (b1 6= 1)
3.(a) =⇒ b1 = 1. Then 1. =⇒ c2 = 1 and 2. =⇒ d3 = 1. This means that
c2 + d3 = 2 > (2P − 4)/(P + 1), in contradiction with 3.(a).
• 7.(a) cannot hold. (b2 6= 1)
7.(a) =⇒ b2 = 1. Then 5. =⇒ c3 = 1 and 6. =⇒ d1 = 1. This means that
c3 + d1 = 2 > (2P − 4 + 2a1)/(P + 1), in contradiction with 7.(a).
• Neither 11.(a) nor 11.(b) can hold. (0 < b3 < 1)
11.(a) =⇒ b3 = 1. Then 9. =⇒ c1 = 1 and 10. =⇒ d2 = 1. This means that
c1 + d2 = 2 > (2P − 4 + 2a1 + 2a2)/(P + 1), in contradiction with 11.(a).
11.(b) =⇒ b3 = 0. Then 9. =⇒ c1 = 0 and 10. =⇒ d2 = 0. This means that
c1 + d2 = 0 < (2P − 4 + 2a1 + 2a2)/(P + 1), in contradiction with 11.(b).
• Either a1 = b1 = 0 or both a1 > 0 and b1 > 0.
If a1 = 0 and b1 > 0, then 1. and 2. show that c2 = d3 = 1, and hence c2 + d3 =
2 > (2P −4)/(P + 1), in contradiction with 3. If a1 > 0 and b1 = 0, then 1. and 2.
show that c2 = d3 = 0, and hence c2 + d3 = 0 < (2P − 4)/(P + 1), in contradiction
with 3.
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Figure 2: The ranges of validity of the ten equilibrium solutions.
• Either a2 = b2 = 0 or both a2 > 0 and b2 > 0.
If a2 = 0 and b2 > 0, then 5. and 6. show that c3 = d1 = 1, and hence c3 + d1 =
2 > (2P − 4 + 2a1)/(P + 1), in contradiction with 7. If a2 > 0 and b2 = 0, then 5.
and 5. show that c3 = d1 = 0, and hence c2 + d3 = 0 < (2P − 4 + 2a1)/(P + 1), in
contradiction with 3.
In poker terms, we have shown that no player has a range strong enough that they
should always bluff with Q, and also that any value bet with A must be balanced by
bluffs with Q and vice versa.
Finally, when a1 > 0 and b1 > 0, by considering 1. and 2., noting that 2a1/P >
2a1/(P + 1), we can deduce that
b1 =
2a1
P + 1
, c2 = 0, d3 =
2P − 4
P + 1
for P ≤ 5,
b1 =
2a1
P
, c2 =
P − 5
P + 1
, d3 = 1 for P ≥ 5. (4)
Note that a similar argument does not work immediately for a2 > 0 and b2 > 0 since
the size of (2− b1)/(P + a1) relative to 2/(P + 1) depends on a1 and b1.
It is now helpful to rewrite the conditions in the more convenient form shown in
Table 1. We used the computer algebra package Mathematica to simplify each of the
2.37 = 4374 combinations of subcases of the nine conditions shown in Table 1 and thereby
determined all possible equilibrium solutions analytically4. The calculation took about
25 minutes on a single core of a standard desktop computer and the solutions found were
then checked by hand. In total we find that there are ten distinct solutions that are valid
in the ranges shown in Figure 2, along with specific solutions when P = 2, 3, 7/2 and 5,
which we label separately. This illustrates the fact that there are three ranges of values
of the pot size, P , for which three equilibrium solutions coexist.
4The code and output has been deposited as ancillary material on arXiv.
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1. (a) a1 = 0 & b1 = 0 & c2 + d3 ≥ (2P − 4)/(P + 1),
(b) b1 = 2a1/P & c2 = (P − 5)/(P + 1) & d3 = 1 & 0 < a1 < 1 & 0 < b1 < 1 &
P ≥ 5,
(c) b1 = 2a1/(P+1) & c2 = 0 & d3 = (2P−4)/(P+1) & 0 < a1 < 1 & 0 < b1 < 1
& P ≤ 5,
2. (a) c2 + d3 > b3 + (1 +
1
2c3)b2 & a1 = 1,
(b) c2 + d3 < b3 + (1 +
1
2c3)b2 & a1 = 0,
(c) c2 + d3 = b3 + (1 +
1
2c3)b2 .
3. (a) b2 > (2− b1)a2/(P + a1) & c3 = 1,
(b) b2 < (2− b1)a2/(P + a1) & c3 = 0,
(c) b2 = (2− b1)a2/(P + a1).
4. (a) b2 > 2a2/(P + 1) & d1 = 1,
(b) b2 < 2a2/(P + 1) & d1 = 0,
(c) b2 = 2a2/(P + 1).
5. (a) c3 + d1 > (2P − 4 + 2a1)/(P + 1) & b2 = 0,
(b) c3 + d1 = (2P − 4 + 2a1)/(P + 1).
6. (a) c3 + d1 >
1
2c3b1 + (1 +
1
2c1)b3 & a2 = 1,
(b) c3 + d1 <
1
2c3b1 + (1 +
1
2c1)b3 & a2 = 0,
(c) c3 + d1 =
1
2c3b1 + (1 +
1
2c1)b3 .
7. (a) b3 > (2− b2)/(P + a2) & c1 = 1,
(b) b3 < (2− b2)/(P + a2) & c1 = 0,
(c) b3 = (2− b2)/(P + a2).
8. (a) b3 > (2− b1)/(P + 1) & d2 = 1,
(b) b3 < (2− b1)/(P + 1) & d2 = 0,
(c) b3 = (2− b1)/(P + 1).
9. c1 + d2 = (2P − 4 + 2a1 + 2a2)/(P + 1).
Table 1: The nine conditions that must be satisfied by an equilibrium solution. For each
of conditions 1 to 8, at least one of the subconditions (a), (b) and (c) must hold.
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The equilibrium solutions are:
Solution 1a: a1 = b1 = a2 = b2 = 0, 0 ≤ b3 ≤ 2
3
, c1 = d2 = 0,
c3 + d1 ≤ b3, c2 + d3 ≤ b3, P = 2. (5)
Solution 1: a1 = b1 = a2 = b2 = 0, b3 =
2
P + 1
, c1 = 0, d2 =
2P − 4
P + 1
,
2P − 4
P + 1
≤ c3 + d1 ≤ 2
P + 1
,
2P − 4
P + 1
≤ c2 + d3 ≤ 2
P + 1
, 2 ≤ P ≤ 3. (6)
Solution 2a: a1 = b1 = 0, b2 =
1
2
a2, a2 ≤ 1
2
, b3 =
1
2
,
c1 = 0, d2 =
1
2
(1 + a2), c3 = 0, d1 =
1
2
,
1
2
≤ c2 + d3 ≤ 1
2
+ b2, P = 3. (7)
Solution 2: a1 = b1 = 0, a2 =
1
2
, b2 =
1
P + 1
, b3 =
2
P + 1
,
c1 = 2P − 6, d2 = 3 + 6P − 2P
2
P + 1
, c3 = 0, d1 =
2P − 4
P + 1
, (8)
2P − 4
P + 1
≤ c2 + d3 ≤ 3
P + 1
, 3 ≤ P ≤ P4 ≡ 1
2
(
3+
√
15
)
≈ 3.43.
Solution 3: a1 = b1 = 0, a2 =
1
2
(
4− P 2 +
√
P 4 − 4P 3 + 4P 2 + 12P + 12
)
, b2 =
2a2
P + 1
,
b3 =
2− b2
P + a2
, c1 =
2P − 4 + 2a2
P + 1
, d2 = 0, c3 = 0, d1 =
2P − 4
P + 1
, (9)
2P − 4
P + 1
≤ c2+d3 ≤ b2+b3, P3 ≡ 1
4
(
3+
√
97
)
≈ 3.21 ≤ P ≤ P4 ≡ 1
2
(
3+
√
15
)
≈ 3.43.
Solution 4: a1 = b1 = 0, a2 =
1
2
(5− P ), b2 = 5− P
P + 1
, b3 =
4(P − 2)
3(P + 1)
,
c1 = 1, d2 = 0, c3 = 0, d1 =
2P − 4
P + 1
, (10)
2P − 4
P + 1
≤ c2 + d3 ≤ P + 7
3(P + 1)
, P3 ≡ 1
4
(
3+
√
97
)
≈ 3.21 ≤ P ≤ 7
2
.
Solution 5a: a1 = b1 = 0, b2 =
4
9
a2, a2 ≥ 3
4
, b3 =
4
9
,
c1 = 1, d2 =
4
9
a2 − 1
3
, c3 = 0, d1 =
2
3
, (11)
2
3
≤ c2 + d3 ≤ 4
9
(1 + a2), P =
7
2
.
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Solution 5: a1 = b1 = 0, a2 = 1, b2 =
2
P + 1
, b3 =
2
P + 1
,
c1 = 1, d2 =
P − 3
P + 1
, c3 = 0, d1 =
2P − 4
P + 1
, (12)
2P − 4
P + 1
≤ c2 + d3 ≤ 4
P + 1
,
7
2
≤ P ≤ 4.
Solution 6: a1 = (4− P )(P + 1), b1 = 2(4− P ), a2 = 1, b2 = 2
P + 1
,
b3 =
2(P − 3)
P + 1
, c1 = 1, d2 =
5 + 7P − 2P 2
P + 1
, c3 = 0, d1 =
4 + 8P − 2P 2
P + 1
, (13)
c2 = 0, d3 =
2P − 4
P + 1
, P6 ≡ 1
2
(
3+
√
23
)
≈ 3.90 ≤ P ≤ 4.
Solution 7: a1 =
1
2
, b1 =
1
P + 1
, a2 = 1, b2 =
2
P + 1
, b3 =
2P + 1
(P + 1)2
,
c1 = 1, d2 =
P − 2
P + 1
, c3 =
2P 2 − 6P − 7
P + 1
, d1 =
4 + 8P − 2P 2
P + 1
, c2 = 0, (14)
d3 =
2P − 4
P + 1
, P6 ≡ 1
2
(
3+
√
23
)
≈ 3.90 ≤ P ≤ P9 ≡ 1
4
(
7+
√
113
)
≈ 4.41.
Solution 8: a1 =
1
2
(9−2P )(P +1), b1 = 9−2P, a2 = 1, b2 = 2
P + 1
, b3 =
2P − 7
P + 1
,
c1 = 1, d2 =
6 + 8P − 2P 2
P + 1
, c3 = 1, d1 =
4 + 8P − 2P 2
P + 1
, c2 = 0, (15)
d3 =
2P − 4
P + 1
, P8 ≡ 1
4
(
7+
√
105
)
≈ 4.31 ≤ P ≤ P9 ≡ 1
4
(
7+
√
113
)
≈ 4.41.
Solution 9: a1 = 1, b1 =
2
P + 1
, a2 = 1, b2 =
2
P + 1
, b3 =
2P
(P + 1)2
,
c1 + d2 =
2P
P + 1
, c3 = 1, d1 =
P − 3
P + 1
, c2 = 0, (16)
d3 =
2P − 4
P + 1
, P8 ≡ 1
4
(
7+
√
105
)
≈ 4.31 ≤ P ≤ 5.
Solution 10a: a1 = 1,
1
3
≤ b1 ≤ 2
5
, a2 = 1, b2 =
1
3
, b3 =
5
18
,
c1 + d2 =
5
3
when b1 =
1
3
, c1 =
2
3
, d2 = 1 when b1 >
1
3
, (17)
c3 = 1, d1 =
1
3
, c2 = 0, d3 = 1, P = 5.
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Solution 10: a1 = 1, b1 =
2
P
, a2 = 1, b2 =
2
P + 1
, b3 =
2P
(P + 1)2
,
c1 =
P − 1
P + 1
, d2 = 1, c3 = 1, d1 =
P − 3
P + 1
, c2 =
P − 5
P + 1
, (18)
d3 = 1, P ≥ 5.
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium frequencies at which Player 1 bets and Players 2 and
3 call. For small enough P (P < P6 ≈ 3.9), Player 1 neither bets with A nor bluffs
with Q at equilibrium. For these values of P , the solid lines in the lower graph show
the bounds between which c2 + d3 must lie at equilibrium. For values above the upper
bound, Player 1 can exploit her opponents by always betting with A; for values below
the lower bound, by always bluffing with Q. For larger values of P , Player 1 has nonzero
betting and bluffing frequencies at equilibrium, including two ranges of P with multiple
solutions. Only Player 3 catches Player 1’s bluffs for P < 5, whilst for P > 5, Player
1 always calls with K and Player 2 also catches bluffs with K at a nonzero frequency
(d3 = 1, c2 > 0).
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium frequencies at which Player 2 bets and Players 3
and 1 call. For P < 3, Player 2 does not bet at equilibrium, and there are upper and
lower bounds on c3 + d1. For P > 3, Player 2 bets at equilibrium, with one range of
multiple solutions. Players 3 and 1 have calling frequencies that have a rather unintuitive
structure at equilibrium. For small enough P , Player 1 is the bluffcatcher, but as P
increases, Player 3 develops a nonzero equilibrium calling frequency. For large enough
P , Player 3 always calls with K and Player 1 has a nonzero calling frequency. This is in
contrast to the frequencies shown in Figure 3, where the player who acts immediately
after the original bettor (Player 2) does not call with K for small enough values of P ,
but the next player to act (Player 3) does.
Figure 5 shows the equilibrium frequencies at which Player 3 bluffs and Players 1
and 2 call. Since Player 3 always bets with A, she has a nonzero bluffing frequency for
all P , which generally decreases as P increases, with some irregular behaviour in the
regions where three equilibrium solutions exist. The most notable feature of the calling
frequencies of Players 1 and 2 is that there is a set of values of P for which Player 1
always calls with K (c1 = 1), followed by a region where there is a range of possible
values of c1 and d1, bounded by the solid lines, followed for large enough P by a set
of values for which Player 2 always calls with K (d2 = 1). It is hard to interpret these
equilibrium solutions, in particular the peculiar way in which the calling frequencies vary
with P , either mathematically or in terms of poker concepts.
The expected profits of each player can be calculated using (1) to (3), and are shown
in Figure 6. Although the existence of multiple equilibrium solutions makes the structure
of these curves quite irregular, Player 3 always has the largest expected profit, because
she acts last, whilst for P > 3, when Player 2 develops a nonzero equilibrium betting
frequency, Player 2 has a larger expected profit than Player 1, because she acts after
Player 1.
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Figure 3: Player 1’s equilibrium betting frequencies and the consequent calling frequen-
cies.
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Figure 4: Player 2’s equilibrium betting frequencies and the consequent calling frequen-
cies.
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Figure 5: Player 3’s equilibrium bluffing frequency and the consequent calling frequen-
cies.
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Figure 6: The expected profits at equilibrium.
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It is also of interest to consider the expected profits for Solutions 2a, 5a and 10a,
which are
Solution 2a (P = 3): 24E1 = −1
2
− 1
2
a2, 24E2 = −1
2
, 24E3 = 1+
1
2
a2, a2 ≤ 1
2
. (19)
Solution 5a (P =
7
2
): 24E1 = −10
9
+
2
9
a2, 24E2 = −2
9
, 24E3 =
4
3
− 2
9
a2 a2 ≥ 3
4
.
(20)
Solution 10a (P = 5): 24E1 = −19
18
, 24E2 =
17
18
−3b1, 24E3 = 1
9
+3b1,
1
3
≤ b1 ≤ 2
5
.
(21)
In Solutions 2a and 5a, Player 2 can transfer profit between Players 1 and 3 at no cost
to herself, although it should be noted that for Solution 5a, with P = 72 , the equilibrium
solution is not unique. In Solution 10a, Player 1 can transfer profit between Players 2
and 3 at no cost to herself. In each case, this can be seen as points of discontinuity in
the expected profits plotted in Figure 6. This may have implications for repeated play
of the game at these pot sizes, as discussed for the one-third street game in [1] and [5].
In two player, zero sum games, such as two player Kuhn poker, all equilibrium
solutions have the same expected profit. This is not the case for the three player zero
sum game that we study here. Moreover, although finding the equilibrium solutions is
important, it is the dynamics of the play of the game, which may or may not lead the
players towards an equilibrium solution, that determine the outcome of repeated play.
4 An ordinary differential equation model of repeated play
In [1] we studied an ordinary differential equation model of a simplified version of one-
third street Kuhn poker. The dynamics are always oscillatory, with only one player
bluffcatching, and the identity of that player determined by the initial betting frequen-
cies. We also showed that a more realistic model, which is based on repeated play of
the game, has similar dynamics, provided that the players neither adjust their frequen-
cies too rapidly nor have too long a memory. In this section we will study an ordinary
differential equation model of the dynamics of repeated play of the simplified full street
game. We find that a wider range of dynamics is available than was possible for the
system studied in [1].
4.1 The ordinary differential equation model
We assume that Player i controls the four frequencies ai(t), bi(t), ci(t) and di(t) (three
frequencies for Player 3, since betting with A is the dominant strategy, which means
that a3 = 1) in order to try to maximise their expected value. For example, we model
the behaviour of Player 1’s betting frequency, a1(t), using
da1
dt
= 24k1a1 (1− a1) ∂E1
∂a1
≡ k1a1 (1− a1) (−2b2 + 2c2 − 2b3 + 2d3 − b2c3) , (22)
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where k1 is a positive constant
5. Each frequency fi satisfies
dfi
dt
= 24kjfi (1− fi) ∂Ei
∂fi
, (23)
where kj are positive constants. The term fi(1 − fi) constrains fi to lie in [0, 1], and
also means that, since dfi/dt = 0 when fi = 0 or fi = 1, all of the equilibrium solutions
of the game discussed in Section 3 are also equilibrium solutions of the system of eleven
nonlinear ordinary differential equations defined by (23). There also exist equilibrium
solutions of the differential equations that are not equilibrium solutions of the game
because they do not satisfy one of the constraints on the sign of ∂Ei/∂fi (see Table 1).
However, for precisely this reason, these equilibrium solutions are unstable with respect
to the dynamics imposed by the differential equations.
From this point onwards, we will fix kj = 1 for j = 1, 2 . . . 11 to reduce the complexity
of the system. The dynamics of this system can be either periodic, close to periodic
or have a long, chaotic transient before being attracted to the boundary of the phase
space (fi = 0 or fi = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3), depending on the size, P , of the pot. The
solution does not asymptote to a steady, stable equilibrium state for any nonequilibrium
initial conditions or pot size P for which we solved the equations. We find, through
numerical computation of the eigenvalues of each of the equilibrium points given by
(6) to (18), that Solutions 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 are unstable. None of Solutions 1, 4, 5, 9
and 10 are asymptotically stable, because each has a centre manifold, but numerical
solutions suggest that they are all Lyapunov stable. In other words, solutions that start
close to these equilibrium points remain nearby, but do not asymptote to equilibrium as
t→∞. Instead, the solutions are attracted to the centre manifold, where the dynamics
are oscillatory. The oscillatory part of the centre manifold has either two dimensions
(Solution 1), four dimensions (Solutions 4 and 5), or six dimensions (Solutions 9 and
10). This will become apparent in the nature of the solutions that we discuss below.
The increase in the dimensionality of the oscillatory part of the centre manifold reflects
the fact that as the pot size, P , increases, Player 2, and then for larger P , Player 1,
has a nonzero bluffing frequency. For 3 < P < P3 ≈ 3.21 and 4 < P < P8 ≈ 4.31
all equilibrium points are unstable, and we observe long chaotic transients before the
solution asymptotes to the boundary of the phase space, with each betting frequency
close to zero or one. Finally, we note that, unlike the ordinary differential equation model
studied in [1], where the initial betting frequencies determined which of two qualitatively
different types of periodic solution emerged as the long time solution, only one type of
behaviour is observed for each P that we studied, but with amplitude dependent on the
initial betting frequencies.
4.2 Numerical solution
In order to solve (23) accurately when the betting frequencies are close to zero and one,
we solved for the dependent variables Fi ≡ log {fi/(1− fi)} instead of fi, in terms of
5The factor of 24 is purely for computational convenience. It has no effect on the qualitative nature
of the dynamics of the system.
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Figure 7: The Lyapunov stable equilibrium solutions, 1, 4, 5, 9 and 10 along with color
codes for the behaviour of solutions. Green = periodic; White = chaotic transient; Blue
= close to periodic.
which (23) take the simpler form
dFi
dt
= 24kj
∂Ei
∂fi
. (24)
We solved the system of equations (24) using the fifth order Runge-Kutta solver ode45
in MATLAB. Figure 7 shows schematically how the qualitative nature of the dynamics
of solutions of (23) varies with pot size, P . We will give an example of a typical solution
from each of these six ranges of values of P . We refer to some of the transient behaviour
of the solutions as ’chaotic’, but note that we have not attempted to study the nature of
this in any detail. Our study of this model is only meant to illustrate that the dynamics
can be far more complex than those of repeated two player, zero sum games.
4.2.1 Case 1: 2 < P < 3
In this case a1 → 0, a2 → 0 and c1 → 0 as t → ∞. The only nontrivial betting
frequencies are b3 and d2, which vary periodically with amplitude depending on the
initial conditions, as shown in Figure 8 for P = 2.5 and three different values of the initial
betting frequencies. The centre manifold of Solution 1 attracts the solution. Player 3’s
bluffing frequency rises and falls, and Player 2, who does the bluff catching, adjusts her
calling frequency in response. This behaviour is typical of solutions for 2 < P < 3 and
is the only case for which the dynamics are similar to those of the system studied in [1].
4.3 Case 2: 3 < P < P3 ≈ 3.21
In this case, all equilibrium solutions are unstable. Although a1 → 0, b1 → 0 and c3 → 0
as t → ∞, the dynamics of b3, c1, d2, a2, b2 and d1 are complicated, and strongly
dependent on the initial betting frequencies, as shown in Figure 9 for P = 3.1 and
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Figure 8: The behaviour of Player 3’s bluffing frequency and Player 2’s calling frequency
for three different sets of initial betting frequencies when P = 2.5. Solution 1 is marked
with a red circle.
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three different values of the initial betting frequencies. Although the initial transient
behaviour appears chaotic and typically lasts until t is between 103 and 104, the solution
eventually asymptotes to the boundary of the phase space, with each betting frequency
close to zero or one. This is likely to be an artefact of the way we have chosen the
differential equations (specifically the fi(1− fi) terms), and we should simply take it as
an indication that the dynamics are nontrivial for this range of pot sizes, for which this
behaviour is typical. Similar comments apply in Cases 5 and 6 below.
4.4 Case 3: P3 ≈ 3.21 < P < 3.5
Solution 4 is Lyapunov stable, but not asymptotically stable, and solutions are attracted
to its centre manifold, the oscillatory part of which is four-dimensional. The nontrivial
betting frequencies are a2, b2, d1 and b3, consistent with the local behaviour of the
centre manifold. Some typical solutions are shown in Figures 10 and 11. Note that a2,
b2 and d1 are related to adjustments in Player 2’s betting and bluffing frequencies and
Player 1’s associated calling frequency (c3 → 0). However, c1 → 1 and d2 → 0, so the
variations in b3 are related indirectly to variations in Player 2’s betting frequency a2,
which determines how likely she is to have an A with which to call Player 3’s bluff. This
behaviour is representative of solutions with P3 < P <
7
2 .
4.5 Case 4: 3.5 < P < 4
In this case, as for P3 < P < 3.5, the solution is attracted to the centre manifold of
Solution 5 the oscillatory part of which is four-dimensional, but in this case leads to
purely periodic solutions, as shown in Figure 12. Note that a2 → 1, c1 → 1 and c3 → 0
as t→∞. This is typical of solutions with 72 < P < 4.
4.6 Case 5: 4 < P < P8 ≈ 4.31
In this case, all of the equilibrium solutions are unstable, and the dynamics are similar to
those for 3 < P < P3. Although c1 → 1, a2 → 1 and c3 → 0, there is a complicated initial
transient, strongly dependent on the initial betting frequencies, as shown in Figure 13
for P = 4.15 and three different values of the initial betting frequencies. However, the
solution eventually asymptotes to the boundary of the phase space, with each betting
frequency close to zero or one. This behaviour is representative of solutions with 4 <
P < P8.
4.7 Case 6: P > P8 ≈ 4.31
In this case, Solution 9 has a seven dimensional centre manifold with six purely imaginary
eigenvalues, and a zero eigenvalue associated with the indeterminacy in c1 and d2 (see
(16)). As shown in Figure 14, b1 and d3, and b2 and d1 behave periodically. The
remaining frequencies, b3, c1 and d2, which are associated with Player 3 bluffing and
Players 1 and 2 calling, have a long, close to periodic transient, but are eventually
20
Figure 9: Chaotic transient behaviour when P = 3.1 for three different initial conditions.
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Figure 10: Typical solutions when P = 3.35 for three different initial conditions. The
red circles indicate the location of Solution 4.
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Figure 11: Time series of a typical solution when P = 3.35.
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Figure 12: Periodic behaviour when P = 3.75 for three different initial conditions. The
red circles indicate the location of Solution 5.
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Figure 13: Chaotic transient behaviour when P = 4.15 for three different initial condi-
tions
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attracted to the boundary of the phase space. For P > 5, qualitatively similar behaviour
occurs around Solution 10.
In each case, we can also calculate each Player’s profit, pi, by solving
dpi
dt
= Ei,
with the expected profit per game Ei given by (1) to (3). In each of the cases discussed
above, each Player’s profit remains close to that given by the Lyapunov stable equilibrium
solution if one exists, close to Solution 2 for 3 < P < P3 and close to Solution 7 for
4 < P < P8. Even when the solution has a chaotic transient, as shown in Figure 9,
the profits pi shown in Figure 15 for these three solutions, closely match the profits
associated with Solution 2.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied a simplified version of three player Kuhn poker, [5], in which
the card J is only in the deck so that there are more cards than players, making the game
nontrivial. Each player must decide whether to bet with A, whether to bluff with Q and
whether to catch bluffs with K. This leads to eleven nontrivial betting frequencies. We
found that there are three ranges of values of the pot size, P , for which there are three
equilibrium solutions. The full structure of the equilibrium solutions was found using
the computer algebra package, Mathematica.
We also studied an ordinary differential equation model of repeated play of the game,
in which each player controls their own betting frequencies and tries to increase the rate
at which they increase their profit, assuming perfect knowledge of all betting frequencies
of every player. Our study of an even simpler game, [1], suggests that this gives some
insight into the dynamics of repeated play provided that the players adjust their betting
frequencies sufficiently slowly, and do not remember the play of the game for too long. We
found that the betting frequencies never asymptote to one of the equilibrium solutions,
and that the qualitative nature of the solutions depends on the pot size in a manner
that is not at all intuitive. Periodic solutions, close to periodic solutions, and solutions
with a long chaotic transient are all possible. This illustrates the fact that repeated three
player poker games, even games as simple as the one studied here, can have very complex
dynamics when the players try to maximise their profit over repeated play of the game,
and concepts of balance and equilibrium, much studied by modern professional poker
players (referred to as ’GTO’ play, [2]), may not be as relevant as they think in games
with more than two players (but see also [3]).
Finally, we also note that the underlying idea of our ordinary differential equation
model, namely that players try to maximise their profits, does not take into account the
possibility of cooperation and alliances forming between the players. Although explicit
collusion is banned in real world poker games, implicit collusion, in which the players
signal to each other within the rules of the game, and no profit is shared outside the
game, can occur, and may have a part to play in games such as the one studied in this
paper. For an example of how this works in another three player game, see [4].
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Figure 14: Periodic and close to periodic behaviour when P = 4.65. The red circles
indicate the location of Solution 9.
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Figure 15: The profits associated with the three solutions for P = 3.1 shown in Figure 9,
along with the profit associated with Solution 2.
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